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Abstract
Previous rubber/virtual hand illusion studies have established important constraints for the illusion that an artificial effector 
becomes part of one’s own body (perceived ownership), and that its actions are being caused by oneself (perceived agency). 
We can take these observed constraints to establish two of three Wegner’s (Trends Cogn Sci 7:65–69; Wegner, Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences 7:65–69, 2003) criteria for the perception of personal agency: priority and consistency, but not Wegner’s 
third criterion—exclusivity. In this study we tested with virtual hand illusion, whether exclusivity (participant is certain 
who was controlling the virtual effector) can also be established. We manipulated two factors: exclusivity and consistency. 
Our results show that on both ownership and agency judgments, consistency and exclusivity produced main effects, and 
the two effects interacted in an underadditive fashion. Taken together, these findings provide support for our suggestion to 
extend Wegner’s agency theory to explain perceived body ownership, which in turn provides an integrative framework for 
interpreting constraints on ownership and agency illusions.
Introduction
How do people create cognitive representations of them-
selves? While this is an old question with a long philosophi-
cal history, it is only recently that research has systematically 
been devoted to investigate the construction of cognitive 
selves. Particularly instrumental was the rubber hand illu-
sion (RHI) first reported by Botvinick and Cohen (1998), 
which consists in the observation that people perceive a seen 
rubber hand lying in front of them as a part of their own 
body, if this hand and their own real hidden hand are stroked 
synchronously. Later studies have extended this design to 
virtual reality, and shown that people perceive a virtual hand 
(Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2008) and 
even a virtual balloon (Ma & Hommel, 2015a) as a part of 
their own body if it moves or changes its shape in synchrony 
with their own, unseen real hand—the virtual hand illusion 
(VHI).
Studies of that sort are commonly considered to tap into 
perceived body ownership, a component of self-perception 
and self-representation that is traditionally considered to 
be separate from perceived agency—the perception to be 
the cause of a given event (Gallagher, 2000a). Some stud-
ies using the rubber hand setup have indeed suggested that 
ownership and agency are dissociable (Gallagher, 2000b; 
Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007; Kalckert & 
Ehrsson, 2012). For instance, participants were reported to 
experience strong agency, but not ownership, over an active 
rubber hand (participants were able to move one finger of 
the rubber hand) presented in anatomically implausible posi-
tions (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 2014a) or at a far distance 
(Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014b). However, other RHI studies 
found evidence for a positive relationship between owner-
ship and agency (e.g., Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006). 
Interestingly for present purposes, indications that owner-
ship and agency might be dissociable are available from RHI 
studies only, while strong and positive correlations are the 
standard observation in VHI studies (Caspar et al., 2015; 
Kokkinara & Slater, 2014; Ma & Hommel, 2015b).
While more research on this interesting discrepancy is 
warranted, it makes sense to assume that, compared to the 
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rather artificial RHI setup, the VHI setup is much more 
natural and provides the participant with many more oppor-
tunities to test the degree to which the virtual effector can 
be controlled. This multiplies the data points available for 
assessing the degree of correlation between one’s own move-
ments and the movements of the virtual effector, which in 
turn provides a solid basis for judgments of ownership and 
agency. In the absence of such a basis, and in the presence 
of a rather strange and unfamiliar experience, as with the 
rubber hand setup and the stroking intervention, it is likely 
that participants draw on various sources of information to 
judge ownership and agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 
2008; Ma & Hommel, 2015b). This is likely to increase the 
variability of the judgments and the probability to con-
sider different data for perceived ownership and perceived 
agency judgments. Consequently, correlations between 
the two judgments should become weaker and may even 
become negative under some circumstances. Considering 
such a scenario, finding more evidence for dissociations and 
a greater variability across studies for the RHI than for the 
VHI should not be too surprising. Even more importantly 
for our present purposes, this implies that occasional reports 
of dissociations between ownership and agency from RHI 
studies should not be taken to speak against the possibility 
of finding a strong relationship between these two judgments 
in a VHI study, as the one reported here.
The idea that perceived ownership and agency might 
rely on partly overlapping informational sources raises an 
interesting theoretical possibility that we aimed to explore 
in the present study with our VHI design. From a conceptual 
viewpoint, the state-of-the-art in the field of perceived own-
ership and agency for artificial effectors and other body parts 
suffers from a lack of integration. Numerous studies have 
shown that the temporal relationship between having one’s 
own hand stroked in seeing an artificial hand being stroked, 
as in the RHI, or between moving one’s own hand and seeing 
an artificial hand moving, as in the VHI, matters in the sense 
that more synchrony leads to higher ownership (Botvinick 
& Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Costantini & 
Haggard, 2007) and agency judgments (Caspar et al., 2015; 
Kokkinara & Slater, 2014; Ma & Hommel, 2015b). Other 
studies have shown that the spatial relationship between 
one’s own body and hand and the artificial effector matters 
as well, in the sense that closer and more natural connec-
tions lead to higher ownership judgments (e.g., Lloyd, 2007; 
Maravita, Spence & Driver, 2003; Preston, 2013; Zhang, 
Ma, & Hommel, 2015). Even other studies have provided 
evidence that the similarity between one’s own hand and the 
artificial effector contributes to the illusion, at least under 
some circumstances (Tsakiris, Carpenter, James, & Foto-
poulou, 2010; Ma & Hommel, 2015a, b). These observa-
tions are certainly interesting and providing important con-
straints for understanding the emergence of the illusion, but 
a theoretical framework that would allow for the systematic 
integration of these factors into a more coherent scenario of 
how perceived ownership and agency is derived, and that 
would guide further empirical research, is lacking. However, 
if we consider that ownership and agency perception may 
rely on the same informational cues in VHI, we need not 
restrict ourselves to theoretical approaches to ownership but 
can extend the scope to theories of agency. The present study 
was motivated by the idea that the agency theory of Wegner 
(2003) might be particularly useful for systematizing owner-
ship- and agency-relevant cues.
Wegner’s theory claims that people perceive agency 
for their own actions to the degree that the effects of these 
actions meet three criteria, which in turn are derived from 
Michotte’s (1946/1963) work on perceived causality: pri-
ority, consistency, and exclusivity. The priority principle 
requires perceived causes to precede, and to be temporar-
ily closely connected to their consequences; the consist-
ency principle requires consequences to be similar to their 
causes; and the exclusivity principle requires the absence 
of other salient possible causes. It is interesting to see that 
two of these principles nicely capture the already known 
constraints for RHI and VHI. Take the reliance of the illu-
sions on the timing between stroking or moving the real and 
the artificial hand. This reliance can be taken to reflect the 
importance of priority, especially in the case of the more 
dynamic VHI setup: moving one’s own hand requires an 
intention to be formed. According to ideomotor theorizing 
(Hommel, 2009; Shin, Proctor & Capaldi, 2010), intentions 
refer to the sensory feedback one expects to emerge from 
the intended action, and the match between expected and 
actual feedback is assumed to determine the degree of expe-
rienced agency (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, 
Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). Arguably, tighter temporal 
synchrony between the movements of one’s real hand and 
the movements of an artificial effector imply a closer con-
nection between one’s intention to move and the perceived 
movements of the artificial effector, which according to 
Wegner’s priority principle should support the perception 
of agency. Given the available evidence for a strong reliance 
of ownership illusions on the temporal synchrony between 
one’s own movements and the movements of artificial effec-
tors, the same would hold for perceived ownership. This 
suggests a strong relationship between agency and owner-
ship, which fits with our previous observation that these two 
judgments are significantly correlated in VHI setups (Ma & 
Hommel, 2015b). Minimal delays between intended action 
and the action of the artificial effector do not only meet the 
requirements of the priority principle, they also fit with the 
consistency principle, in the sense that intended and actual 
movement are more consistent with each other in the case 
of temporal synchrony. The consistency principle further 
captures the observation that greater similarity between 
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one’s own effector and the perceived artificial effector can 
increase ownership and agency perception, and the findings 
that artificial effectors induce more ownership and agency 
if they are closely connected to one’s body and/or seem to 
extend one’s actual effector in a natural way.
Aim of study
The fact that two of Wegner’s three principles provide a 
convenient summary and conceptual integration of the 
available evidence raises an obvious question: how about 
Wegner’s third principle, exclusivity? Accordingly, the pre-
sent study investigated whether exclusivity can be demon-
strated to play a role in the VHI. Our experimental approach 
resulted from combining our previous virtual effector setup 
(which gives the rise to the illusion that a virtual balloon 
that grows or shrinks as the participant opens or closes his 
or her real hand; Ma & Hommel, 2015a, b) with Wegner 
and Wheatley’s agency study (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). 
These authors induced uncertainty about agency by having a 
task performed by the actual experimental participant and a 
confederate, who could both contribute to a common action 
outcome. Wegner and Wheatley did not manipulate exclu-
sivity (i.e., the confederate was always present) but this can 
be easily achieved by comparing this joint-action setup with 
a condition in which the participant is working alone. We 
combined this manipulation with the manipulation of the 
degree to which the movements of the virtual balloon were 
actually controlled by the participant’s own movements or by 
computer-generated noise (which in the non-exclusivity con-
dition the participant was thought to attribute to the confed-
erate). We will refer to this manipulation as “consistency”, 
even though it arguably comprises of priority aspects as well 
(i.e., the label consistency might be taken as shorthand for 
consistency/priority).
We used the virtual balloon (rather than, say, a virtual 
hand) as virtual effector for two reasons. Firstly, our adap-
tation of the Wegner and Wheatley task required two indi-
viduals (the actual participant and a confederate) to sit side-
by-side and putting one of their hands (the hand that would 
operate the virtual effector) inside a box. Asking both indi-
viduals to use their right (dominant) hand for that purpose 
would have had the disadvantage of creating a substantial 
distance between the two operating effectors. We therefore 
chose to seat the actual participant on the left, so that he/
she could use his/her right hand, and the confederate on 
the right, so that he could use his left hand. Had we used 
a virtual hand as virtual effector, this would have created 
unequal relationships between the two operating, real hands, 
however: using a right virtual hand would have fit with the 
participant’s but not with the experimenter’s hand, in the 
opposite would have been true when using a left virtual 
hand. Secondly, we thought that the experience of random 
movements of the virtual effector, which we needed to intro-
duce in our design, might be easier to tolerate and still find 
relatively natural for a virtual effector that does not look like 
a hand—over which perfect control is the standard experi-
ence. As we found no difference with respect to perceived 
ownership and agency between a virtual human hand and 
a virtual balloon varying in size in a previous study (Ma & 
Hommel, 2015a), we considered the balloon a reasonable 
solution to these two problems. One may object that previous 
RHI studies (e.g., Tsakiris et al., 2010) were taken to suggest 
that people are unable to incorporate non-corporeal objects 
into their perceived self. However, findings demonstrating 
the contrary were not only obtained by Ma and Hommel 
(2015a) but in a number of other VHI studies (e.g., Short & 
Ward, 2009; Ma & Hommel, 2015a, b) and RHI (Armel & 
Ramachandran 2003; Liepelt, Dolk, & Hommel, 2017) as 
well. Hence, the available evidence provides some support 
for the assumption that perceived ownership in VHI is not 
restricted to corporal effectors but extends to non-corporal 
objects, where they can induce the same degree of perceived 
ownership and agency as corporal effectors, provided that 
they move with, and exhibit some degree of perceived con-
nectedness with one’s real effector (Ma & Hommel, 2015a).
We considered three dependent variables: perceived 
body ownership and perceived agency, which served for 
testing our hypotheses, and proprioceptive drift. The lat-
ter, which we included for explorative purposes, is a more 
implicit measure of ownership that previously was found to 
pick up different aspects than ownership and agency ques-
tionnaires (Rohde, Di Luca, & Ernst, 2011), but is widely 
used as an objective measurement for the perceived illusion 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014a). 
Our predictions regarding perceived ownership and agency 
were threefold. First, we expected an effect of consistency 
(i.e., an increase of ownership and agency with increasing 
consistency), which can be considered a conceptual rep-
lication of previous observations of increased ownership 
and agency with synchrony between one’s own, real move-
ments and the movements of a seen artificial effector (Ma 
& Hommel, 2015a). Second, and this would be one novel 
contribution of the present study, we expected an effect of 
exclusivity (i.e., more ownership and agency with exclusiv-
ity), which would support our claim that Wegner’s theory 
(Wegner 2003) can be used to interpret rubber hand and 
virtual effector illusions.
Third, we were interested to see how consistency (i.e., 
consistency/priority) and exclusivity would relate to each 
other. Wegner’s theory does not suggest a particular kind 
of relationship between its agency criteria, which might be 
taken to suggest an additive model, but others have been 
more specific. In particular, Synofzik et al. (2008) have sug-
gested that agency perception may emerge from the integra-
tion of multiple sources of information, and there is evidence 
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that the same holds for ownership perception (Ma & Hom-
mel, 2015b). If so, it is possible that information from some 
sources can compensate for the lack of information from oth-
ers, which would suggest an underadditive relationship, in 
the sense that a particular source is considered more the less 
informative other sources are. Finally, as a more explorative 
endeavor, we were interested to see whether proprioceptive 
drift, a more implicit measure of ownership and agency, 
would show the same pattern as the questionnaire data.
Method
Participants
Thirty-three participants (9 males; mean age = 18.82 years, 
standard deviation (SD) = 1.014, range 17–21) were 
recruited from Southwest University, China, in exchange 
for pay. Participants were naive with respect to RHI/VHI. 
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants 
before the experiment, the study was approved by the local 
human research ethics committee at Southwest Univer-
sity, the methods were carried out in accordance with the 
approved guidelines.
Setup
The setup was similar as in our previous study (Ma & 
Hommel, 2013), where a balloon (that grew or shrank as 
the participant opened or closed his or her real right hand) 
served as artificial effector. We used a virtual reality envi-
ronment (Vizard); a dataglove (5DT, measurement fre-
quency = 75 Hz, latency = 13 ms), which participants wore 
with their right hand; a black box (width 54.4 cm × depth 
23 cm × height 12 cm), in which the participant put his or 
her right hand along the depth axis, so to shield it from view; 
and a cape placed over the participant’s right shoulder to 
cover the space between the participant and the virtual effec-
tor. We designed a virtual balloon and imported it, together 
with the dataglove module, into Vizard, so that the virtual 
balloon that was shown in the middle of the computer screen 
on the box was controlled by the data from the dataglove, 
i.e., by the participant’s hand movement (see Fig. 1) in all 
relevant conditions.
From the beginning, participants wore the dataglove with 
their right hand, put their right hand in the box, wore the 
cape on their shoulder, and looked at the computer screen 
placed on the box (see Fig. 1a, b). The virtual balloon was 
visible on the screen in front and to the right of the par-
ticipant, and it changed in size (becoming 1.0 times bigger 
Fig. 1  The experimental setup used to manipulate exclusivity. a Side 
and b top view of participants when experiencing the virtual balloon 
(exclusive condition); c top view of participant (seated on the left, 
using the right hand) and experimenter (seated on the right, using the 
left hand) when experiencing the virtual balloon together (non-exclu-
sive condition)
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or 0.5 times smaller) when participants opened and closed 
their hand.
In the exclusive conditions, the participant was perform-
ing alone (see Fig. 1b). In the non-exclusive conditions, how-
ever, the experimenter would also wear a dataglove (covered 
by the same box) and a cape, and sit side-by-side with the 
participant, as shown in Fig. 1c. The computer screen show-
ing the virtual balloon was 54.4 cm wide, with the left edge 
of the computer screen set as zero position, the position of 
the virtual effector was 27.2 cm. In the exclusivity condi-
tions, the position of participants’ real right hand middle fin-
ger tip was 22.2 cm; while in the non-exclusivity conditions, 
the position of participants’ real right hand middle finger tip 
was still 22.2 cm, the position of experimenter’s left hand 
middle finger tip of experimenter was 32.2 cm; the posi-
tion of virtual balloon was in the middle of participant and 
experimenter. Unbeknownst by the participant, the experi-
menter’s dataglove was not connected to the computer, and 
all contributions to the balloon’s size changes that were not 
produced by the participant were actually generated by the 
computer. However, the experimenter did move his or her 
real hand, there were no any instructions whether this would 
or would not be the case, so to create a plausible degree of 
uncertainty about who is controlling the balloon.
The consistency condition was determined by the control 
scripts, so that the virtual balloon size change was actually 
controlled by a particular combination of the participant’s 
real hand movement and computer-generated noise. The 
participant’s hand movement was multiplied by a weight (1, 
0.5 or 0) and mixed with different percentages weight (0, 
0.5 or 1) of noise. In the 100% consistency condition, the 
contribution of noise was set to zero, so that the size of the 
balloon was perfectly correlated with the real hand move-
ment of the participant. In the 50% consistency condition, 
the contribution from the real hand movement and noise was 
50% each, and in the 0% consistency condition, only noise 
was considered to control the size of the balloon. This means 
that the consistency between the movements of the real hand 
and the virtual balloon was 100, 50 and 0% in these condi-
tions, respectively. Participants were not informed about the 
degree of consistency or, in the non-exclusive conditions, 
about the contribution from the experimenter.
Design
Participants underwent six conditions, which resulted from 
crossing the two factors, exclusivity (two levels) and consist-
ency (three levels). Each level of exclusivity was combined 
with three consistency conditions. In the 100% consistent 
condition, the size changes of the virtual balloon were effec-
tively controlled by the participant’s own hand movements, 
so that the felt real hand movement and seen virtual bal-
loon size changes matched completely. In the 50% consistent 
condition, only 50% of the actual size changes of the virtual 
balloon were controlled by the participant’s hand movement 
(i.e., that was true for 100% of the trials), so that the match 
between felt real hand movement and seen virtual balloon 
size changes was noticeably imperfect. In the 0% consist-
ent condition, the size changes of the virtual balloon were 
entirely unrelated to the participant’s hand movements. Con-
sistency varied within exclusivity and participants always 
experienced the exclusive conditions before the non-exclu-
sive conditions. The order in which the three consistency 
conditions varied within each exclusivity condition was 
counterbalanced across participants, but the same for both 
exclusivity conditions.
Procedure
When participants first came to the lab, they were asked to 
put on the cape and the dataglove on their right hand and 
put their right hand into the box. The cape was arranged in 
such a way that it covered the box and participants’ arm, so 
that participants could not see their real right hand but only 
watch the virtual balloon on the computer screen. Partici-
pants then performed in three consistency conditions alone, 
before they were joined by the experimenter and performed 
the remaining three consistency conditions.
There were four phases in each of the six conditions. 
First, in the proprioceptive drift pre-measurement phase, 
participants were asked to verbally report a letter in the letter 
array shown on the top of computer screen to represent the 
felt position of their real right hand. Letter sequences in the 
letter array were changed in each condition to prevent indi-
vidual strategies (Ma & Hommel, 2015b). Second, partici-
pants were asked to keep their real right hand palm upwards, 
freely open and close their right hand but not to move their 
hand horizontally, and watch the corresponding movement 
of the virtual balloon for 2 min. Third, participants were 
asked to rest their right hand with the same posture as in 
the first phase, again to verbally report a letter in the letter 
array to represent the felt position of their real right hand 
middle finger tip: the proprioceptive drift post-measurement. 
Fourth, participants were asked to fill in the questionnaire. 
There was a 2-min time break between each two conditions, 
a rest image was shown on the computer screen and par-
ticipants were asked to take a rest, so to reduce possible 
transfer effects.
Questionnaire
To assess the extent to which participants felt the agency and 
ownership sense when experiencing the VHI, we used an 
adapted Chinese version of the RHI/VHI questionnaire (Bot-
vinick & Cohen, 1998; Slater et al., 2008; Kalckert & Ehrs-
son, 2014a). In particular, we presented participants with 
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eight questions assessing perceived body ownership (Q3–4) 
and agency (Q1–2). We included four more questions for 
explorative purposes (e.g., I felt as if the virtual balloon on 
the screen was a part of my body; How much of the size 
changes of the virtual balloon was controlled by me?), but 
will focus here on the four traditional ownership and agency 
questions. For each statement, participants responded by 
choosing a score on a 7-point (1–7) Likert scale, ranging 
from 1 for ‘strongly disagree’ to 7 for ‘strongly agree’. The 
statements were:
 Q1. The size changes of the virtual balloon on the screen 
were caused by me.
 Q2. I can control this virtual balloon as I wish.
 Q3. I felt as if I was looking at my own hand when I was 
looking at this virtual balloon.
 Q4. I felt as if the virtual balloon on the screen was my own 
hand.
Proprioceptive drift
Participants were asked to only open and close their right 
hand, but not to change its horizontal position, and there 
were two baffles in the box around the real hand to block 
its horizontal replacement; hence, the spatial relationship 
between virtual effector and participant’s real right hand was 
always the same in all conditions. During the experiment, we 
recorded the letters in the letter array corresponding to the 
felt position of the real hidden hand middle finger tip before 
and after the illusion induction (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; 
Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014a; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 
2006). We measured the actual position of each letter in 
the letter array shown on the screen. The letter sizes dif-
fered depending on their alphabetic shape, with the biggest 
letter measuring approximately 0.4 cm. We calculated the 
proprioceptive drift by subtracting the participants’ felt posi-
tion at the pre-measure from the felt position at the post-
measure, so that positive values imply a drift towards the 
virtual balloon.
Results
We aggregated the four relevant questionnaire ratings into 
the two respective categories: ownership (Q3,4) and agency 
(Q1,2) (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014a; Ma & Hommel, 2015b). 
Ownership and agency ratings, each questionnaire item 
rating, as well as the drift rates were analyzed by means 
of 2(exclusivity) × 3 (consistency) two-way ANOVAs for 
repeated measures. All results are shown in Table 1 and 
Fig. 2. We considered it appropriate to analyze our data by 
means of ANOVAs, because they are known to be robust 
against violations of normality assumptions and because we 
applied Greenhouse–Geisser corrections in case of viola-
tions of sphericity assumptions. However, as our data are 
maybe argued to be ordinal in nature, we also analyzed the 
data by means of non-parametric Friedman tests and two-
tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank post hoc tests—without any 
change of the outcome. We also analyzed the two items for 
each category separately, by means of both ANOVAs and 
non-parametric tests, which revealed only one deviation 
from the reported pattern, which will therefore be the only 
finding from these extra analyses that we will report below.
Ownership ratings
The two significant main effects of exclusivity, 
F(1,32) = 18.32, p < .001, ŋp2 = 0.36; and consistency, 
F(2,64) = 36.48, p < .001, ŋp2 = 0.53; were further medi-
ated by a significant interaction, F(2,64) = 10.37, p < .001, 
ŋp2 = 0.25. Follow-up t tests (all two-tailed) revealed that the 
effect of exclusivity was significant for the 0%-consistency 
condition, t(32) = 5.24, p < .001, d = 1.37; but not for 50% 
consistency, p = .085, or 100% consistency, p = .426. That is, 
participants perceived less ownership for the virtual balloon 
in the non-exclusive than in the exclusive condition when 
the movements of the participant’s real hand and the virtual 
balloon were entirely inconsistent, while exclusivity did not 
matter if there was at least some degree of consistency.
Table 1  The two criteria, means and standard errors for the ratings of ownership and agency questions, proprioceptive drift, in all six conditions, 
+: exclusive; −: non-exclusive; 100%: 100% consistent; 50%: 50% consistent; 0%: 0% consistent
Consistency Exclusivity Ownership (Q3–4) Agency (Q1–2) Proprioceptive 
drift (cm)
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
100% + 4.35/0.26 6.39/0.15 1.00/0.54 4.39/0.31 4.30/0.32 6.58/0.11 6.21/0.23
50% + 3.27/0.28 5.18/0.28 0.25/0.18 3.12/0.28 3.42/0.30 5.24/0.29 5.12/0.31
0% + 3.23/0.30 3.06/0.28 0.26/0.54 3.18/0.30 3.27/0.30 3.18/0.28 2.94/0.30
100% − 4.20/0.30 6.68/0.09 0.66/0.16 4.24/0.32 4.15/0.33 6.76/0.09 6.61/0.11
50% − 2.70/0.25 4.56/0.23 0.24/0.21 2.61/0.25 2.79/0.26 4.33/0.25 4.79/0.25
0% − 1.42/0.16 1.26/0.10 0.21/0.17 1.36/0.16 1.49/0.16 1.27/0.11 1.24/0.11
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Agency ratings
The two significant main effects of exclusivity, 
F(1,32) = 16.79, p < .001, ŋp2 = 0.34; and consistency, 
F(2,64) = 267.11, p < .001, ŋp2 = 0.89; were further medi-
ated by a significant interaction, F(2,64) = 14.62, p < .001, 
ŋp2 = 0.31. Follow-up t tests revealed that the effect of 
exclusivity was significant for the 0% consistency condi-
tion, t(32) = 6.16, p < .001, d = 1.65, but not for 50% consist-
ency, p = .08, or 100% consistency, p = .144 [item-specific 
t tests showed the same pattern for Q2, where exclusivity 
was significant for 0% consistency, t(32) = 5.43, p < .001, 
d = 1.47, but not for 50%, p = .4, or 100% consistency, 
p = .16; while for Q1 exclusivity was significant for both 
0%, t(32) = 6.51, p < .001, d = 1.71, and 50% consistency, 
t(32) = 2.58, p = .015, d = 0.59; but not for 100% consist-
ency, p = .226]. Overall, this pattern perfectly mimics the 
one obtained for ownership, with exclusivity playing a 
role only in the absence of any consistency. This similarity 
was also confirmed by an ANOVA with question dimen-
sion (ownership vs. agency), exclusivity, and consistency 
as within participant factors. Most importantly, the three-
way interaction was far from significance, F(2,64) = 0.495, 
p = .612, suggesting that both scores were affected by the 
experimental factors in a similar way.
We also computed the correlations between the question-
naire ratings of ownership and agency (one-tailed Spearman, 
n = 33), which revealed significant positive correlations for 
0% consistency under exclusivity, r = 0.573, p < .001, close-
to-significant correlations for 50% consistency under exclu-
sivity, r = 0.286, p = .053, but far-from-significant correla-
tions for all other conditions, with rs < 0.197, ps > .136.
Proprioceptive drift
The main effect of consistency was significant, 
F(2,64) = 3.52, p = .035, ŋp2 = 0.10, but the main effect of 
exclusivity and the interaction was not, Fs < 0.229. Least-
significant difference (LSD) post hoc tests revealed that the 
100% consistency condition differed from both the 50% con-
dition (mean difference 0.59, SE 0.29, p = .049) and the 0% 
condition (mean difference 0.60, SE 0.21, p = .007), while 
the latter two did not differ (mean difference 0.01, SE 0.27, 
p = .96). That is, participants perceived a stronger drift of 
their right hand towards the virtual balloon when the move-
ments of real hand and balloon were 100% consistent, while 
there was no difference if consistency was less or absent.
Discussion
The key question motivating this study was whether exclu-
sivity, one of Wegner’s (2003) three-agency criteria, could 
be established as a factor impacting both perceived body 
ownership and agency. The outcome of the study supports 
this assumption.
First, we did not only observe an effect of consistency 
(or consistencies/priority), which we take as a conceptual 
replication of previous synchrony effects (Ma & Hommel, 
2015a), but also a significant main effect of exclusivity. The 
former confirms the contribution of objective controllabil-
ity, i.e., priority and consistency, to subjective ownership 
and agency (Ma & Hommel, 2015b). The consistency effect 
is in line with previous findings (Sanchez-Vives, Spanlang, 
Frisoli, Bergamasco & Slater 2010) and suggests that visuo-
motor correlations are sufficient for the illusory ownership 
perception. The latter extends previous demonstration of 
an impact of priority and consistency on perceived owner-
ship and agency to exclusivity, suggesting that all three of 
Wegner’s (2003) key factors play a role in ownership and 
Fig. 2  Ownership and agency, proprioceptive drift rating results as a 
function of consistency and exclusivity. The unit for proprioceptive 
drift is cm, and all error bars represent ± 1 standard error
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agency. This in turn suggests that his action recognition 
approach may provide a suitable theoretical framework for 
understanding both agency and ownership phenomena and 
reinforces the assumption that agency and ownership rely on 
overlapping, if not identical informational sources, at least 
in the VHI paradigm (Ma & Hommel, 2015a, b). Indeed, 
we found that ownership and agency ratings were equally 
affected by the manipulated variables.
Second, we also found that consistency and exclusivity 
interacted, showing that consistency has a stronger effect 
if exclusivity is absent, and that exclusivity has a stronger 
effective when consistency is low or absent. This outcome 
pattern supports the assumption that judgments of both 
agency (Synofzik et al., 2008) and ownership (Ma & Hom-
mel, 2015b) rely on multiple informational resources that 
are integrated in such a way that the lack of one kind of 
information can be compensated by the presence of another. 
Our finding also shows that, when priority and consistency 
criteria were perfectly met, the exclusivity itself was not able 
to modulate subjective ownership and agency. This corrobo-
rated the (apparently greater) importance of a match between 
seen virtual balloon movement and participants’ intention 
and voluntary action and is consistent with some previous 
studies. In particular, Wegner et al. (2004) observed that par-
ticipants perceive the movements of two “alien hands” (of an 
unseen person standing behind them) as their own as long 
as they heard the instruction describing the action that fol-
lowed. In other words, spatiotemporal consistency between 
an action and a represented “action intention” (which appar-
ently does not even need to belong to the participant) can be 
strong enough to fully compensate for the obvious absence 
of exclusivity. This might suggest that other things being 
equal to some of Wegner’s three principles might be more 
important than others but, in the absence of a common met-
ric that allows comparing the strength of manipulations of 
these principles, this possibility will be difficult to test.
Given the not yet fully understood relationship between 
ownership and agency judgments, on the one hand, and more 
implicit measures such as proprioceptive drift, on the other, 
we had no specific hypotheses regarding the drift rates. We 
did find an effect of consistency, which fits with previous 
observations (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014a), but no effect 
of, or including exclusivity. While we have no explanation 
for this particular pattern to offer, we note that this find-
ing is consistent with previous suggestions that propriocep-
tive drift and questionnaire ratings may not assess the same 
mechanisms, and that self-judgments may integrate more 
and/or different sources of information (Holmes, Snijders, 
& Spence, 2006; Ma & Hommel, 2015b; Rohde, Di Luca, & 
Ernst, 2011; Abdulkarim & Ehrsson, 2015). It is not impos-
sible that the presence of two people in our setup has played 
a role in dissociating explicit and implicit measures. With 
respect to the explicit judgments, our findings demonstrate 
that VHI can be induced in joint setups. However, it might 
be interesting to note that Obhi and Hall (2011) reported 
dissociation between explicit and implicit measures in a 
joint-action task. In their study, one participant acted as ini-
tiator and another as responder, and it turned out that explicit 
feelings of agency were only reported by the initiator, while 
both initiator and responder showed evidence of agency in 
implicit measures. Numerous differences in rationale and 
setup between this study and ours make a comparison dif-
ficult and speculative, but the possibility that the sociality 
of the situation may affect explicit and implicit measures 
differently raises interesting questions that call for further 
investigation.
One may raise objections against our interpretation based 
on the fact that the questionnaire ratings were relative low 
overall, and in fact lower than in many investigations of the 
RHI (e.g., Tsakiris et al., 2010; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 
2014a). As already discussed at some length elsewhere 
(Ma & Hommel, 2015a), this is, however, likely to do with 
our particular experimental setup (i.e., the reliance on VHI 
rather than RHI) rather than with a possible weakness of 
the induced illusion. This is for instance suggested by the 
observation that the rating effects obtained with a virtual 
hand and with a virtual balloon are almost identical (Ma 
& Hommel, 2015a), which rules out the possibility that a 
biologically plausible effector induces a stronger illusion 
than a biologically less plausible effector and suggests that 
whatever kind of illusion a virtual hand might induce is also 
induced by a virtual balloon. Indeed, other experiments with 
virtual effectors have reported equally low ratings (Sanchez-
Vives et al., 2010).
Why virtual setups induce lower ratings is an interest-
ing question that we at present can only speculate on. As 
compared to the rather artificial RHI setup, the VHI setup 
is much more natural and the participant has many more 
opportunities to test the degree to which the virtual effector 
can be controlled. As we have discussed in the introduction, 
this multiplies the data points available for assessing the 
degree of correlation between one’s own movements and 
the movements of the virtual effector, which in turn is likely 
to reduce the strength of the correlation (as the translation 
of real into virtual movements still underlies some technical 
limitations). It might also be that the substantial artificiality 
of the RHI induces different criteria for judging ownership 
and agency, which might boost the ratings. In any case, more 
research on this issue will be necessary.
To summarize, we were able to demonstrate the relevance 
of exclusivity for subjective body ownership and agency, and 
found that both judgments were equally affected by this fac-
tor. As we have discussed, previous findings already showed 
that temporal synchrony between the movements of one’s 
own and an artificial effector, spatial alignment between 
one’s own body and an artificial extension, and similarity 
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between one’s own and an artificial effector are crucial for 
obtaining RHIs and VHIs. If we take these findings to indi-
cate Wegner’s (2003) priority and consistency principles, 
our present findings provide the missing third link by estab-
lishing the importance of the exclusivity principle. This 
implies that Wegner’s theoretical account provides a sys-
tematic, comprehensive framework to integrate the various, 
not yet well-connected observations of temporal, spatial, and 
similarity constraints for obtaining ownership and agency 
illusions. Moreover, given that Wegner’s theory is based 
on systematic work on causality perception from Michotte 
(1946), this provides us with a broad and solid theoretical 
basis for systematically exploring the informational cues and 
perceptual mechanisms underlying self-perception.
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